Reiner Verbrecher Staat, wo die Organisierte Kriminalität, sich auch die Posten in der Polizei erkauft.

Pässe, In Hand von Verbrechern, mit einer Alibi Frau aus München

Endri Meksin dhe kompaninë e tij MC NETWORKING

https://joq-albania.com/artikull/1194315.html

Die Mafia Frauen ohne Verstand und Fake Ausbildung: PasspOrt IT Chefin: „Loina Prifti“ der Firma: „IdentiTec“

24. November 2024

Zef Brozi, Bernd Fisher, Philip Reeker, Shinasi Rama über die Kommunistischen Stalin Methoden des Salih Berisha

Mafia Clan: Bylykbashi und das Scheitern der Wahlrechts Reform und der neue US Report!

Albanien Plötzlich sterben

Zef Brozi

 

Im ärmsten postsozialistischen Land Europas tobt ein erbitterter Machtkampf der Wendehälse.

17.09.1995, 13.00 Uhr • aus DER SPIEGEL 38/1995

https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/ekskluzive-zef-brozi-per-report-tv-ne-1995-shtepia-ime-u-rrethua-nga-anetare-te-shik-e-bandite-te-berishes-shba-me-shpetoi-jeten?r=kh1

x-Verfassungrichter über die Mord Methoden des letzten Stalinisten in der Welt: Salih Berisha

Salih Berisha, war schon 1995 schlimmer als Enver Hoxha und ging damals über Leichen, was mit der Ermordung des Azem Hajdari einen Höhepunkt fand in 1998, als A. Hajdari, 2 Wochen vor seiner Ermordung die Absetzung des Salih Berisha forderte, als PD Vorsitzenden.

1995 und heute in 2012, ein unverbesserlicher Schwer Verbrecher, Extremist und der letzte Stalinist in der Welt: Salih Berisha! Immer gegen die Justiz und gegen die Medien! Viel schlimmer wie Enver Hoxha, denn so extrem kriminell, war nicht einmal Enver Hoxha. Albanien: US Professor Nikolla Pano, über die korrupte und inkompetente Justiz 
20.3.2012: Der Komiker Eduard Halimi, als Justiz Minister, wirft der General Staatsanwälting vor, nicht Verfassungs gerecht zuarbeiten 18.3.2012: Hat Salih Berisha Kontakte und Geschäfte mit dem Serbischen Geheimdienst UDB? Der Albanische Justiz Minister, die Tirana Mafia im Umfeld der Tirana Staatsanwaltschaft, welche die EU Justiz Mission ausbremst Durch die inzwischen veröffentlichten und vom Ex-US Botschafter John Withers bestätigten wikileaks cables, wird Enkeled Alibeaj, schwer belastet, das er gegen Geld, prominente Mörder freiliess, für die Wahlkampf Unterstützung.

wikileaks und Report Über 20 Jahre Justiz Aufbau in Albanien und erneute Angriffe gegen die Generalstaatsanwälting 18.09.1995

Albanien

Plötzlich sterben

Im ärmsten postsozialistischen Land Europas tobt ein erbitterter Machtkampf der Wendehälse.

Noch bin ich fit und kerngesund“, beteuerte der Mann in schwarzer Robe erregt gestikulierend. „Sollte ich demnächst plötzlich sterben, dann fragt den Präsidenten Berisha, wie das geschah.“

Albaniens ranghöchster Jurist Zef Brozi, Vorsitzender des Kassationsgerichts in Tirana, redete sich so richtig in Rage. Am Morgen, so empörte er sich vor eilends zusammengerufenen Journalisten, habe eine Polizistenmeute sein Gericht umstellt, Personal am Betreten des Gebäudes gehindert, Richter mißhandelt, einen Kollegen gekidnappt und sich auch noch an ihm selbst vergriffen, als er gegen diese Übergriffe einschreiten wollte. „So etwas“, entrüstete sich der oberste Hüter des Gesetzes, „haben wir hier nicht einmal zu Enver Hodschas Zeiten erlebt.“ Die Erinnerung an die zäheste stalinistische Diktatur in Osteuropa – aus deren Stall übrigens beide Kontrahenten kommen – war in der zweiten Septemberwoche ein Höhepunkt im Konflikt zwischen Staats- und dritter Gewalt in jenem postsozialistischen Land, das als letztes den Weg zur Demokratie gefunden hatte. Dabei geht es nur vordergründig um eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen Exekutive und Justiz. In Wahrheit ist es ein Kampf um die Macht im Staat. Präsident Sali Berisha, 51, als privilegierter Stipendiat des alten Regimes in Paris zum Mediziner ausgebildet und bis zum Leibarzt des Diktators aufgestiegen, hatte sich nach dem ersten Aufmucken von Dissidenten 1990 zum quicken Wendehals gemausert, der den Kommunismus fortan eine „schwere Krankheit“ nannte. 1992 erzielte er in seinem Wahlkreis Kavaje für die von ihm geführte Demokratische Partei ein an alten Brauch erinnerndes Ergebnis von 98 Prozent. Das Parlament wählte ihn zum ersten Präsidenten des demokratischen Albanien. Auf seinen Vorschlag ernannte die Volksvertretung auch den ihm aus gemeinsamen Uni-Zeiten bekannten Juraprofessor Zef Brozi zum Vorsitzenden des Kassationsgerichts. Zum Bruch zwischen den beiden Aufsteigern kam es, als Berisha im Vorjahr eine auf seine Person maßgeschneiderte Verfassung durchdrücken wollte. Der Entwurf konzentrierte die Macht beim Präsidenten, stärkte die Polizeibefugnisse und sah sogar den Einsatz der Armee bei inneren Konflikten vor. Da im Parlament die dafür notwendige Mehrheit nicht zu erreichen war, wollte Berisha sein Werk per Volksabstimmung absegnen lassen. Das brachte nicht nur die von den Wende-Sozialisten geführte Opposition gegen den sich immer autoritärer gebärdenden Staatschef auf. Auch Oberrichter Brozi verdammte den „Verfassungsputsch“. Gegen alle Erwartungen verlor Berisha die Volksabstimmung: 54 Prozent der Wähler lehnten den Entwurf ab. Brozi sorgte für weitere Niederlagen des Staatschefs. Er nutzte ein neues Strafrecht, um verurteilte Politiker des alten Regimes vorzeitig aus der Haft zu entlassen, darunter Albaniens letzten KP-Chef und Präsidenten Ramiz Alia. Als abzusehen war, daß auch Ex-Premier Fatos Nano freikommen könnte, der 1994 in einem umstrittenen Verfahren wegen Korruption zu zwölf Jahren verurteilt worden war, setzte die Kampagne gegen den widerborstigen Richter ein. Denn der zum Märtyrer hochstilisierte Nano hätte gute Aussichten, mit seinen Sozialisten die Wahlen im nächsten Jahr zu gewinnen – angesichts des Elends im Lande, das am Tropf karger Auslandshilfe hängt und ansonsten vom Schmuggel lebt: Waren aus Griechenland, Benzin nach Rest-Jugoslawien, Flüchtlinge nach Italien. Unter allen Umständen will der Präsident verhindern, die Macht dann mit einer ihm feindlich gesinnten Regierung zu teilen. Richter Brozi wurde kommunistischer Umtriebe beschuldigt; drei seiner Kollegen setzte der Justizminister wegen ehemaliger Dienste für die Sigurimi, Albaniens Stasi, ab. Das wiederum prangerte der Oberrichter als Gesetzesbruch an, forderte den Rücktritt des Ministers und warf Berisha „Willkürherrschaft“ vor. In den bis Mitte September zum „offenen Krieg“ (Gazeta Shqiptare) verschärften Konflikt wurden auch Diplomaten hineingezogen. Von der Opposition um Hilfe gegen die „Belagerung“ des Kassationsgerichts gebeten, schoben die Ausländer nächtens vor Brozis Haus Wache, um seine Verhaftung zu verhindern. Auch der US-Botschafter setzte sich für den Richter ein. Das war besonders peinlich für den Präsidenten, da der vergangene Woche zum Staatsbesuch nach Washington flog, um – im Austausch für Stützpunktrechte der US-Luftwaffe im Bosnien-Einsatz – mehr Wirtschaftshilfe zu erbitten. Geheimdienstagenten überwachen den rebellischen Richter weiter rund um die Uhr. Als Brozi seine Warnung vor Gefahr für Leib und Leben aussprach, lauerten die Spitzel mit Richtmikrofonen und Videokameras in einem hellen Opel vor dem Haus. Y

DER SPIEGEL 38/1995

EU und die USA, lehnen das korrupte Banditen System des Salih Berisha und der “Skrapari” Ilir Meta BAnde Freie Fahrt für Terroristen, Gangster und extrem Verbrecher in Albanien: Tirana – Durres Terrorist: BLEDI MUSA SHUAIPI und die rund um die Xhafzotaj – SHIAK Mafia Familie des: Agim Hoxha DW: Wenn Volks Terroristen die “Kultur der Straflosigkeit” in Albanien zelebrieren Die Peinlichkeit im Null Funktion Staat, wenn die Ilir Meta / Spartak Braho uralt Mafia, die Justiz kauft Schlimmer als im Bürger Krieg 1997: Albanien und Eigentum, mit der Null Funktion einer Polizei und Justiz Enver Hoxha System im kriminellsten Terror Staat der Welt des Salih Berisha mit einer Klientel Mafia Polizei aus Tropoje aktiv und die guten Freunde, erhalten neue Identitäten Prominenten Killer und Kokain Boss Arjan Selimi (Armando Andoni – Freund von “Inis Gjoni“) , wurde in Tirana hingerichtet von der EU bestätigt und schwer kritisiert! Das Mafia Parlament in Tirana, fälscht mit Josefina Topalli sogar Gesetzes Abstimmungen Albanien im Chaos, wo kein Gesetz mehr gilt mit Wahl Fälschung zum Bürgermeister in Tirana, um Tirana auszubeuten! Die dreisten Lügen, des sogenannten “Minister“?! Lulzim Basha, rund um UN – EU . ITCY Ermittlungen. Der Ex- Staats Sekretär des Ilir Meta, Almir Rrapo wurde ausgeliefert und Edi Rama fordert: die Absetzung der Parlaments Präsidentin J. Topalli. “This is madness, no this is politics” :: USA erlassen 2004: Einreise Verbot gegen korrupte und kriminelle Albaner Politiker und deren Familien Der Umwelt Minister Fatmir Mediu, als Partner der Italienischen “Camorra“, will Müll Import Geschäfte machen “State Capture” der Internationalen Mafia in die Albanische Politik USA streichen 16 Millionen $ Justiz Aufbau Hilfe für Albanien

Eingestellt von navy um 14:15 Keine Kommentare:

Labels: Albanien, Justiz, Salih Berisha, Zef Brozi

Mittwoch, 19. September 2012

20 Jahre kriminelles Enterprise der Salih Berishia Mafia in Albanien

Der Ex-US Botschafter John Withers, sagte vor wenigen Tagen: Albanien ist wie Libyen, oder Ägypten, was noch sehr vornehm ausgedrückt ist. Most criminal of the world: Salih Berisha und was der US Professor Shinas Rama, über diesen Banditen Clan sagt. Das Salih Berisha Verbrecher Kartell ( Salih Berisha DP Party Mafia)hier im Focus der Geschichte. Immer die selbe Methoden, Shows für ausländische Beobachter und geheime Anweisungen und Todes Dekrete, was bei den Schulen schon anfing, wo die Lehrer instruiert wurden in 1995, Ausländern Nichts zu Sagen und die Schulkinder mussten das Salih Berisha Bildungs System loben. Heute ist das Bildungs System vollkommen ruiniert, wo ein Rektor an der Tirana Unveristät vor kurzem sagte: die Studenten können nicht einmal einen Satz richtig schreiben. Rrokaj: Studentët nuk dinë më as shqipen bazike 18 Shtator, 2012

CORRUPTION, INCLUDING bribery, thievery, and favors, remains the only way of getting things done in Albania, from paying electricity bills to conducting international relations. Prevalent in all the former communist countries, corruption is having an increasingly harmful effect on young democratic societies, especially in a country as poverty-stricken as Albania. Voters there registered a protest against the raging lawlessness when, at the end of 1994, they defeated a referendum on a new draft constitution. President Sali Berisha admitted that the defeat had less to do with the constitution itself than with the government’s failure to tackle corruption. The exposure of corruption within the ruling Democratic Party (PD) seems to have weakened it and has also put Berisha’s political standing in question. The 6 November defeat of the new draft constitution caused some to suggest that Berisha may not survive his full four-year presidential term, which runs through March 1996. When Berisha was elected president of Albania in 1992, following almost 50 years of communist dictatorship, one of his first moves was to declare war on corruption. Although apparently sincere in calling it Albania’s greatest enemy, Berisha has not managed to stem the rising tide of corruption. Consequently, the population has become disheartened; it appears to many that little has changed in the shift from communism to democracy. That disillusionment – felt sharply by the poor, who bear the brunt of economic reform’s “shock therapy” – turned to anger when the Berisha government failed to go to battle. To the poor, democracy and free-market ideals mean little; they have seen only a new group fattened by privilege and wealth gained through corruption. The referendum gave the poor a voice, and they in turn gave the government a loud “no.” The PD, unable to offer another explanation for the defeat, sprang into action to fight corruption. THE OPPOSITION’S EXPLOITATION The opposition, led by the powerful Socialist Party (PS), took advantage of the referendum by turning corruption into a major political issue. The PS is usually quick to exploit for its benefit the Democrats’ political setbacks, but the corruption issue is slightly different. The roots of Albanian corruption are traceable both to the communist era and to the brief period under socialist rule that ended in March 1992. The Socialists, even though their own record regarding corruption is far from clean, are aiming their propaganda guns at the issue in an effort to regain power. The Democrats responded to Socialist attacks by going on the offensive themselves. An article in Rilindja Demokratike, which is run by the PD, berated the “social-communists” for belittling the fight against corruption.1 The daily reported that the Socialists “played the political scene with the card of corruption in the same way they had previously done with the card of class struggle.” The Democrats defended themselves in the article by pointing to some figures in the war against corruption: the State Control Commission fined 510 people a total of 7,713 million lek ($85.7 million), indicted 367 people, and took administrative measures against another 17,177 officials and civil servants. Some say those figures, however, do not paint a true picture. The State Control Commission is accused of failing to act on several cases of blatant corruption. For example, miners at Albania’s largest chrome mine, in Bulqize, staged a hunger strike in late January 1995 to demand the dismissal of the mine director, who they claimed was abusing his power. The commission investigated the mines and reportedly discovered evidence of “large-scale corruption.”2 It supposedly requested the dismissal of the director and the head of the local branch of the Finance Ministry, but no action was taken on that request. That was further evidence of the pervasiveness of corruption, which appears to reach to the highest levels of government, despite constant pledges that it is being fought. The Democrats do not seem to grasp the fact that the population tends to forget or ignore the past and instead concentrate on current events in their lives. This is even more true now, when the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” is steadily widening and some of the democratic newcomers are becoming visibly richer through their new connections. The Democrats had promised a better life for all and not just for a few; many Albanians are now bitter with resentment. Time may show that Berisha is badly mistaken in his belief that Albania will not follow some other formerly communist countries in bringing socialists back to power. He has said that Albania’s particularly harsh, Stalinist brand of communism makes a return of socialists to power impossible. However, it is possible that the frustration caused by social injustice and corruption could prompt voters to return former communists to rule as they have done in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. It has become the Democrats’ custom to explain and justify the country’s many unsolved problems by blaming them all on 50 years of radical communism . While Berisha could be correct in pointing to communism as the root of corruption, placing the sole blame there does not seem to be the right approach. The people are simply tired of listening to the same refrain, which becomes even less convincing when many in central and local government seem only to grow in power or wealth. BERISHA’S LONELY BATTLE President Berisha has been waging the campaign against corruption almost single-handedly. He continues to live modestly, remaining in the same small apartment where he lived before he became president. (He is known, however, to have a penchant for nice clothes.) Observers of the Albanian scene say Berisha is one of the few politicians who have not become rich through political circumstance. But although he stands as a lonely and pious example, Berisha has limited himself to rhetoric, not attempting to tear out the roots of corruption or to fight it within his party and government. When the Albanian voters rejected’the draft constitution, Berisha immediately acknowledged the result as a protest against government inefficiency and corruption, and he praised the people for having shown their anger “in an admirable, democratic manner.”3 At his year-end press conference in late December, he tried to explain the phenomenon of corruption: “Corruption is one of communism’s most bitter legacies; it experienced a great leap forward during the final days of the dictatorship and unfortunately has passed on to the post-dictatorship period. It we look back four or five years, no Albanian could get a refrigerator or a television without first paying for authorization – not to mention getting a job or something else. This unfortunately has remained to this day. Corruption is a serious problem in all newly democratic societies. It is one of the most disturbing problems and must be fought more resolutely.”4 —– 1 Rilindja Demokratike, 28 December 1994. 2 ASD, 3 February 1995. 3 Rilindja Demokratike, 8 November 1994. 4 Rilindja Demakratike, 29 December 1994. The defeat of the referendum had several repercussions. On 4 December 1994, Berisha reshuffled the cabinet, a move that will very likely be followed by other high-level realignments throughout 1995 in anticipation of the national elections, expected in 1996. Although some of the ministers in question were not specifically fired on corruption charges, it was clear that they had been cast from their posts precisely for that reason. Even under the present conditions of democracy, corruption remains as much a way of life in Albania as it was under communism. As Berisha noted, in the past, no one could buy major appliances without a bribe: today, no one can even pay bills for water, electricity, or other services without first bribing an official. To get decent medical care, either private or state-supported, people must pay substantial bribes.5 While some consider this merely an aberration – an irritation of living in present-day Albania – it nevertheless causes great frustration. But far more serious is the corruption at the highest levels of power and administration, which has caused even more bitterness and anger. HIGH-LEVEL ACCUSATIONS The political climate in Albania has become heated over the last few months. The government prosecuted many cases both directly and indirectly related to corruption, all in an arena of open media. The press freely reported and commented on the various scandals, bringing the issue into the public eye. It was during this time that a case referred to as the “Arsidi scandal” returned to court. Former Prime Minister Vilson Ahmeti was tried for the second time, together with former Trade Bank director Agron Saliu and his deputy Agim Tartari, for misappropriating $1.2 million. They allegedly paid that money in 1991 to Nicola Arsidi, a French citizen who was authorized by previous and present administrations to negotiate forgiveness of Albania’s foreign debt (which is estimated to be more than $1.1 billion.)6 Those government leaders had already been sentenced to between two and seven years in prison on the charges, but their appeal to a higher court won them a retrial on the basis of new evidence. That new evidence also implicated former National Bank governor Ilir Hoti and another former Trade Bank director, Ardian Xhyheri. The government has also accused former Deputy Prime Minister Rexhep Uka and former Finance Minister Gene Ruli of abuse of office and corruption in connection with the export of walnut wood by the timber company Elbasan. Former Trade Minister Artan Hoxha was also accused of abusing his position. Ruli and Uka are presently parliament deputies, and on 16 March, legislators voted 63 to 44 against lifting their immunity.7 The 29-year-old Hoxha is currently in Italy doing postgraduate work. Former Transport and Communications Minister Fatos Bitincka and Albert Gajo, an adviser to Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, have also been accused of falsifying documents and abusing their power.8 In mid-January, the state prosecuted an Albanian legislator for the first time – Democrat Arben Lika, who was charged with cigarette smuggling. That trial, which Supreme Court Chief Justice Zef Brozi is presiding over, has been covered extensively by the press. At least one reporter has written that “the trial may be problematic for many of Lika’s former colleagues, meaning that they might be involved in their own shady dealings. When five PD deputies demanded in January that the chief justice’s immunity be lifted so he could be arrested for abusing his power, the news hit the country like a bolt of lightning. Brozi, a PD member, had been nominated by Berisha as chief justice in an effort to stamp out corruption in the judiciary. Rumor had it that Brozi felt betrayed and abandoned by the president. Some PD deputies reportedly wanted him out because he insisted on prosecuting those guilty of corruption, regardless of party affiliation. The five deputies accused Brozi of illegally approving an early release from jail of a Greek citizen convicted on drug charges. The accusation, however, was clearly politically motivated. Brozi publicly denied any wrongdoing, saying, ‘The record of my struggle against corruption in Albania precludes the possibility of me being corrupt.”10 In fact, Brozi has won high praise for his fight to keep Albania’s courts independent and free from the dictates of politics. He claims – and many believe him – that some corrupt, high-ranking Democrats who fear judicial independence are bent on destroying him. The clash between Brozi and Minister of Internal Affairs Agron Musaraj – whom Brozi has accused of ”directing a mafia network and employing despotic methods against arrested people” – is also interesting in this context.11 On 1 February, the Albanian parliament voted 53 to 49 not to lift Brozi’s immunity. The decision was seen as a smashing victory for the chief justice and another political setback for the PD.12 Brozi said after the vote, “The era when votes were dictated has been replaced by an era when everyone can vote according to his own conviction and conscience.” Brozi also thanked journalists for their support.13 The Brozi case clearly displays the internal battles and divisions within the PD, likely caused by widespread corruption at the highest seats of power, that sooner or later arc bound to wreak political havoc. The incident, however, could positively affect President Berisha’s political fortunes if he can muster enough strength and support from the party to disable the politically and economically corrupt, as he did with the cabinet reshuffle in December. PARTY SPLIT? In addition to the falling electoral support manifested by the referendum defeat, Berisha could be equally threatened by a potential split within his party. The close parliamentary vote against lifting Brozi’s immunity is an indication that members have different agendas. Another sign is the sacking of PD leader Eduard Selami at an extraordinary party congress on 5 March, when 607 of the 664 participants voted against him in an open ballot. That was in the wake of Selami’s threat in late January to resign and his subsequent demand that the constitution be adopted by parliament instead of through a referendum. Selami said the party chief should also be prime minister, a statement interpreted as an effort to unseat Meksi, the present government leader. He also said the government was making a mistake by “not listening to the voice of the party,” adding that there was a “gap between the government and the PD, and the government in power must carry out the party’s policies.”14 All these developments are in one way or another related to the disease of corruption plaguing the country. A rift appears to have divided the party into two main groups: the forces fighting the party’s involvement in corruption, and those who are now trying to survive accusations. Whatever happens, there is relatively little time left before the scheduled national elections in 1996, and this period will be a trying time for Berisha. If the Democratic Party – or whatever is left of it – fails to reinvig-orate itself under Berisha’s charismatic leadership, it could prove disastrous for the president’s political future. —– 5 Interviews by the author in Albania. 6 Gazeta Shqiptare and Aleanca, 10 January 1995. 7 Gazeta Shqiptare, 17 March 1995. 8 Koha Jone, 30 December 1994. 9 Populli Po, 12 January 1995. 10 Zeri, 18 January 1995. 11 Koha, 11 January 1995. 12 Gazeta Shqiptare, 2 February 1995. 13 Rilindja, 4 February 1995. 14 Gazeta Shqiptare, 31 January 1995. http://www.tol.org/client/article/3069-albania Fun Facts About Our New Allies [2] The Progressive Review (Washington), 22 June 1999 “Albania … offered NATO and the U.S. an important military outpost in the turbulent southern Balkans (in the 1990-96 period Albania opened its ports and airstrips for U.S. military use and housed CIA spy planes for flights over Bosnia)…. The U.S. played a major role in the DP’s 1992 electoral victory, and it then provided the new government with military, economic, and political support. In the 1991-96 period Washington directly provided Albania $236 million in economic aid, making the U.S. the second largest bilateral economic donor (following Italy)…..Following Berisha’s visit to the U.S. in March 1991, Washington began supplying direct assistance to the DP, including donations of computers and cars for the 1992 electoral campaign. William Ryerson, the first U.S. ambassador, stood next to Berisha on the podium at election rallies. The U.S. failed to criticize, and at times encouraged, the new president as he purged critics of his policies within the judicial system, police, and the DP—often through illegal means. By 1993 DP loyalists and family members held most of the prominent positions in Albania’s ministries, institutes, universities, and state media. Citing the threat of communism’s return, Berisha successfully instilled fear in the population and discredited his rivals. The U.S. embassy in Albania contributed to the polarization of Albanian politics by refusing to meet most of the opposition parties (former communists as well as others) for the first two years of DP rule. This one-sided view of democratization helped Berisha dismantle most political alternatives, some of which were moderate and truly democratic.

Uwe. G. Kranz, Ltd. Ministerialrat, Organisierte Kriminalität und Terrorismus – eine kritisch

Europäischer Polizeikongress, Berlin,14.02.2007, http://www.euro-police.com/pdf/kranz_2007.pdf

Adriatik Kelmendi, Prostitution Racket Flourishes, Balkan Crisis Report, http://iwpr.net/?apc_state=hsqfbcr157963&l=en&s=f&o=157965

Der Ja-Sager Präsident Bujar Nishani, der mit Vorsatz die Justiz und Polizei zerstörte – nun gibt es Entführungen in Tirana

Neuer UN secret Bericht aus 2003, wo es um die Kindes Entführungen geht, zur Organ Entnahme und die enge Zusammenarbeit mit dem Verbrecher Kartell aus Tropoje: Salih Berisha, was ja wie heute bewiesen ist, auch direkt in die Todes Schwadronen rund um die Rugova Morde, mit Xhavit Halili, Hashim Thaci, Ferdinand Xhaferie und dem wohl vom CIA ermordeten damaligen US Botschafter Josef Limprecht verwickelt sind (Mitte Mai 2002), der ja eine Legende ist, für seine Bin Laden, Terroristen Verbindungen, inklusive Morde und Chef des wohl grössten Drogen Ringes in Albanien.

……………………………

Yassin Kadi, der Bin Laden Financier und die Albaner UCK – KLA Terroristen

Xhavit Halili, Xhaferi, und Berisha, hatten ein Treffen in 1998, wie hier dokumentiert. Man kannte sich bestens.
Albanian Secret Service Chief Fatos Klosi in 16.5.1998 in der “Albania” durch den Albanischen Geheimdienst Chef Fatos Klosi: KLA (UCK) is financed by Bin Laden

Xhavit Halili, Hashim Thaci und die Fatos Nano und Berisha Mafia

UCK – KLA killer swadron

300 Nah-Ost Terroristen und Islamische Terroristen, waren in Nord Albanien unterwegs und sind noch heute Ehrengäste im Kosovo. der spiegel brachte auch hier den Artikel.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily | Mar.17,2004 | Gregory R. Copley,
Editor,
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
Volume XXII, No. 50 Friday, March 19, 2004
© 2004, Global Information System, ISSA
Exclusive Special Report
“During the first half of August 2003, 300 Albanian-trained guerillas
— including appr. 10 mujahedin (non-Balkan Muslims) — were
infiltrated across the Albanian border into Kosovo, where many have
subsequently been seen in the company (and homes) of members of the
so-called Kosovo Protection Corps which was created out of Kosovo
Albanian elements originally part of the KLA. In fact, the Kosovo
Protection Force seems almost synonymous with the Albanian National
Army (ANA), the new designation for the KLA. The guerillas were
trained in three camps inside the Albanian border at the towns of
Bajram Curi, Tropoja and Kuks, where the camps have been in operation
since 1997.”
……….
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1100906/posts Bin Laden, Geldwäsche und die Amerikaner haben damit kein Problem im Balkan, wo als auch noch der Drogen- und Waffen Schmuggler des US Botschafter Josef Limprecht publik wurde, der Botschafter Mitte Mai 2002 eliminiert wurde. Diese zeigen, dass Albanien ist sicherlich nicht ein eklatantes Beispiel der Demokratie. Mit Berisha hat Albanien getan weniger als einen Zustand Gangster als Regierung verkleidet und Sie schulden ihnen Amerikaner und Albaner, um diese Situation zu verbessern. Der AAEF, verkaufte illegal Grundstücke in Albanien und organisierte dies mit der American Bank of Albania (einer Gründung des CIA finanzierten AAEF, welche auch als Geldwäsche Stelle für Internationale Terroristen wie einem Yassin Kadi – Bin Laden Financier arbeitete, siehe auch der [15] Terrorist Abdul Latif Saleh – Damir Fazllic – Salih Berisha // als Partner Wesley Clark)! Im Februar 2012, wird der Jordanier [16] Hamze Abu Rajan (Hamzeh Abu Rayan) zu 4 Jahren Haft verurteilt, als Ex-Manager der Yassin Kadi Firma: Loxhall Sh.P.K.

Freitag, 25. Mai 2012

 

US Statedeparments Reports: 1995 – 2012, über das Idioten Kartell, des Mafia Clans: Salih Berisha in Albanien

2011 Human Rights Report – Albania (May 24, 2012)
………….
Freedom of Press: The independent media were active and largely unrestrained, although there were cases of direct and indirect political pressure on the media, including threats against journalists. At times political pressure and lack of funding constrained the independent print media, and journalists reported that they practiced self-censorship. Political parties, trade unions, and other groups published newspapers or magazines independent of government influence.
The government controlled the editorial line of the public Albanian Radio and Television, which operated a national television channel and a national radio station and, by law, received 50 percent of its budget from the government. While private stations generally operated free of direct government influence, most owners believed that the content of their broadcasts could influence government action toward their other businesses. Business owners also freely used media outlets to gain favor and promote their interests with both major parties.

Sonntag, 24. Juni 2012

Fatos Lubonja: Albania, is in the hands of primitiv bandits

Fatos Lubonja: Albania, is in the hands of bandits,political opposition, is the decor, I predict riots

Lubonja tests in recent months but more frequent, have increased the dose of civic revolt,the criticism against the political system and claim to be his equals stopped to this passivity. We have considered writing to the president’s choice for the loss of political dialogue, to private universities, for former political prisoners and their use as electoralcommodity. Most numerous political primitivism hit directly responsible to the loss

Albanien: US Professor Nikolla Pano, über die korrupte und inkompetente Justiz
Rückblick 1995 und 1996, über das Verbrecher Kartell des Salih Berisha
Komplette Idioten, werden als Richter, Staatsanwälte, Minister, Polizei Chefs, Direktoren, oder gar als Admiral eingesetzt in 1996: Rear Admiral Edmond Zhupani, ohne jede Militär und Marine Ausbildung!Einzige Qualifikation. Berg Ziegen Hüter, aus Tropoje den letzten Neanderthalern in Euroopa, die in der Bildung und Kultur, weit hinter jedem Steinzeit Menschen zurückgeblieben sind.

vor über 20 Jahre, funktioniert der Polizei Apparat teilweise, dankt einem Deutschen

Aufbau der Polizei, mit PAMECA und „Klaus Schmidt“ und heute der Verkauf, der Polizei an kriminelle Clans